Nearly seven in ten young Europeans skip the ballot in European elections. Is this a sign of democratic disinterest, or a new form of political engagement? Let’s discuss it with researchers Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut, from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences, who contribute to the European project YouthDecide 2040. Its early findings reveal how young people view democracy, map their political behaviors and priorities, and suggest strategies to boost their participation.
Missions Publiques. What does the term ‘young people’ mean to you? What are the common challenges faced by this age group (18–35 years old), which seem to encompass very different realities and life situations?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. The term young people or youth is most commonly used to describe individuals aged roughly 15/16 to 24 or 29, as in definitions adopted by the Eurostat or the UN. In this project, however, the YouthDecide consortium chose a broader definition and included individuals up to the age of 35. This reflects an important social reality: in several parts of Europe – particularly Southern Europe – “youth” has become an increasingly inclusive category, given rising life expectancy, delayed economic independence, and later family formation.
For practical reasons, including data availability and ethical constraints, we could not include respondents aged 15–17. As a result, we focused on the 18–35 age group, which I believe is a reasonable and analytically meaningful way to think about young Europeans today.
It is, of course, true that a 19-year-old faces very different life circumstances and challenges than a 34-year-old. This is precisely why, both in our analysis and in the recruitment for project activities, we distinguish between the 18–25 and 26–35 subgroups, in order to ensure that diverse experiences and perspectives are represented.
That said, there are also important commonalities across the broader 18–35 cohort, particularly when compared to older generations – especially middle-aged cohorts. These shared features are especially visible in attitudes toward politics and democracy. I would highlight four key characteristics:
- First, the share of young people in Europe’s population is declining, and with it their political influence. Youth interests remain structurally underrepresented in decision-making processes.
- Levels of political knowledge and understanding are substantially lower among young Europeans than among older generations. A sizeable share of youth is apathetic, politically detached, or disaffected, and does not participate politically at all.
- Democracy is often not the top priority for young Europeans. Economic concerns – such as rising prices, employment, and housing – as well as climate change tend to dominate their issue agenda.
- While young Europeans broadly value democracy in principle, they show weaker attachment to core liberal democratic principles and greater openness to strong leadership unconstrained by legal limits compared to older cohorts.
Finally, an interesting difference between the two age subgroups concerns the sources of democratic legitimacy among young people. In Europe, these sources are primarily based on trust in institutions and assessments of the political system, rather than on behavioral engagement. Contrary to popular belief, young people are not systematically less supportive of democracy: 18–24-year-olds often report high levels of trust in key institutions such as parliaments, courts, and the European Union. However, this trust declines significantly among 25–34-year-olds, highlighting a “window of opportunity” to strengthen democratic engagement in the early years of adulthood, before disillusionment sets in.
"The youth is not less political, but political in ways that institutions are poorly designed to absorb
Edit Zgut-Przybylska
From the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences
Missions Publiques. According to your study, young people will have less electoral influence in 2040, due to declining numbers and lower participation in traditional civic activities like voting. On the other hand, youth tend to be more present in activist spaces. How can you explain that? What has surprised you or reinforced your views about this trend?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. The relationship between age and political participation has been extensively studied in the literature on electoral behavior. One of the most robust findings is that conventional electoral participation follows a curvilinear pattern: turnout increases with age, peaks among middle-aged citizens, and may decline again at older ages due to increasing costs of participation. Middle-aged citizens typically have more at stake in elections and are more socially embedded, which reinforces voting as a habitual behavior. By contrast, young people are less likely to identify with political parties, experience weaker social pressure to vote, and may perceive electoral outcomes as less consequential for their immediate lives. As a result, turnout among youth is consistently lower.
What is particularly concerning is that a substantial share of European youth is not only disengaged from voting but apathetic toward politics altogether. Despite recent turnout increases in some countries, the long-term trend in electoral participation remains downward, suggesting that this is not merely a life-cycle effect whereby young people eventually “grow into” voting. Generational effects also appear to be at play.
Many young people seem to have lost faith in representative democracy. Whether they re-engage through traditional channels depends heavily on the capacity of parties and political institutions to deliver tangible outcomes. Voting is, after all, a habit – and if abstention carries no visible consequences over multiple elections, disengagement can become entrenched.
Another troubling and related trend is the growing acceptance of undemocratic practices among parts of the youth. Populist, illiberal, and even authoritarian alternatives to liberal democracy appear increasingly normalized, particularly as far-right ideas lose their social stigma.
At the same time, there is a growing group of so-called critical citizens. These young people are dissatisfied with how democracy works, yet still regard it as the best available system. They often turn to non-electoral and non-conventional forms of participation – such as activism, demonstrations, or boycotts. While they may favor more contentious forms of engagement, they are also more likely to support deliberative democracy and enhanced citizen participation beyond periodic elections. Importantly, most of them continue to vote.
Our findings show that many young people perceive formal politics as slow, unresponsive, and dominated by older generations, so they turn to arenas where they experience greater immediacy, visibility, and impact: protests, issue-based campaigns, digital mobilization, and community initiatives. What reinforced our expectations is how consistent these patterns are: low trust in institutions coexists with high issue engagement. What surprised us is not disengagement, but the strength of political motivation outside electoral channels. The youth is not less political, but political in ways that institutions are poorly designed to absorb.
Missions Publiques. Which political issues do young people care about the most, particularly those who say they are engaged?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. Generally speaking, not the rule of law or liberal democratic principles. These are often taken for granted, particularly in Western and Northern Europe.
Instead, young people tend to prioritize two broad sets of issues: first, material and economic concerns – such as rising living costs, housing shortages, and job insecurity; and second, climate change and environmental sustainability.
"Democratic resilience depends not only on institutional performance but also on aligning governance with citizens’ evolving normative expectations
Piotr Zagórsk
From the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences
Missions Publiques. What differences do you observe in young people’s political engagement and attitudes toward democracy across different countries ?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. Regional variation is crucial for understanding democratic attitudes among young Europeans. Youth in Northern and Western Europe consistently report higher levels of democratic support, institutional trust, and satisfaction with democracy. By contrast, young people in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and especially EU candidate countries exhibit lower levels across these dimensions.
In Northern and Western Europe, satisfied democrats dominate. In Southern Europe, critical democrats are more prevalent. In Central, Eastern, and New Europe, apathy and openness to undemocratic practices are significantly more common.
Missions Publiques. Your findings identify five profiles of young people’s attitudes toward democracy. Can you describe these profiles and explain how they will guide the recruitment of participants for upcoming national workshops?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. Among young Europeans, we can identify five distinct profiles. First, the “satisfied democrats” (~25%) are highly supportive of democracy, trusting of institutions, and active across multiple forms of participation. Next are the “disaffected youth” (~17%), who are deeply distrustful, disengaged, and politically inactive. Then come the “critical democrats” (~18%), committed to democracy in principle but dissatisfied with its performance, often engaging in contentious activism. The “non-democrats” (~16%) exhibit weak democratic commitment, low trust, and minimal participation. Finally, the “middle” group” (~24%) is ambivalent toward democracy, moderately supportive, and primarily engaged through voting.
These clusters differ sharply in their democratic attachment, openness to authoritarian rule, trust, efficacy, and participation patterns. They highlight the heterogeneity of youth political orientations and the need to design democratic innovations that reach beyond already committed democrats. This is why, in recruiting participants for national workshops, we place special emphasis on engaging young people who are less enthusiastic about democracy – especially the apathetic. Otherwise, we risk preaching to the choir.
Missions Publiques. What specific strategies or “levers” could increase political participation among young people?
Piotr Zagórski and Edit Zgut-Przybylska. Without institutional mechanisms such as lowering the voting age, strengthening youth representation, or incentivizing older generations to take youth interests seriously, young people alone will struggle to shape Europe’s democratic future. Fostering intergenerational alliances is crucial for bridging democratic divides and ensuring that the strengths and perspectives of different age cohorts reinforce democratic resilience. Democratic innovations must account for the heterogeneity of youth political orientations, engaging not only committed democrats but also disaffected and non-democratic groups. Without addressing the core sources of youth dissatisfaction – such as cost-of-living pressures and environmental concerns – liberal democracy will remain on precarious ground among younger cohorts.
Increasing youth participation requires changing both access and incentives. First, institutions must lower practical and psychological barriers: easier voter registration, first-time voter outreach, and civic education that builds political self-efficacy. This is crucial because participation is strongly linked to whether young people feel competent and heard. Second, and equally important, formal politics must connect to the participatory spaces where youth are already active. Mechanisms like participatory budgeting, citizens’ assemblies, youth councils with real consultative power, and structured feedback on how youth input shapes policy create visible links between voice and outcome. The key is not simply mobilization, but responsiveness.
Ultimately, democratic resilience depends not only on institutional performance but also on aligning governance with citizens’ evolving normative expectations. While legitimacy remains relatively high among young adults, its fragility among slightly older cohorts highlights the risk of disillusionment if institutions fail to deliver.
